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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

II.

III.

Whether mercury emitted in particle form from a coal burning power plant is a solid waste for purposes of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act's (RCRA) citizen suit
provision?
Whether a non-profit organization has standing under
RCRA's citizen suit provision when it alleges two of its members can no longer keep the fish they catch from a contaminated lake due to Buena Vista's mercury emissions?
Whether a state has standing under RCRA's citizen suit provision when a coal burning power plant pollutes its waters in

* This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions, other than
technical publication revisions, have been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law Review.
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a manner that requires a ban on the consumption of fish
caught from the lake?
Whether the emission of mercury from a coal burning power
plant, permitted under the Clean Air Act (CAA), is a violation of RCRA?
Whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
and RCRA section 7002(b) are unavailable to preclude the
present litigation due to a prior state court opinion?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of New Union is unreported, but is published in full in the
record. (R. at 1- R. at 9).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. (FLT) is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the protection of Lake Tokay in the State of
New Union (R. at 3). Buena Vista Power Co. (Buena Vista) owns
and operates two coal-fired power plants in the State of Blue Skies
(R. at 3). FLT brought suit against Buena Vista under the citizen
suit provision of RCRA to abate further emission of mercury from
Buena Vista's plants which allegedly presents an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health and the environment (R. at
3). The State of New Union has intervened (R. at 3). Appellants
FLT and New Union seek an injunction requiring Appellee Buena
Vista to cease all emissions of mercury from its two plants (R. at
3).
It is undisputed that Appellee's coal burning plants emit minute particles of mercury by escaping the plants' pollution control
equipment and entering the atmosphere (R. at 3). Appellants allege that many of these mercury particles are transported to the
airstream over New Union where they fall to the surface (R. at 3).
It is further alleged that some of these particles enter Lake Tokay
and its watershed (R. at 3-4).
Due to elevated mercury levels in the fish population of Lake
Tokay, the New Union Department of Public Health has issued a
health advisory, banning the sale of fish from the lake and advising the public against consumption of the fish for fear of mercury
poisoning (R. at 4). In response to the advisory, two members of
FLT have stopped consuming their catch after twenty years of recreational fishing on Lake Tokay (R. at 4). EPA studied the Lake
Tokay region and concluded that most of the mercury entering the
lake originates at Appellee's plants in Blue Skies (R. at 4).
Appellants contend that the mercury contamination of Lake
Tokay's fish, coupled with the health risks associated with human
consumption of the fish, presents precisely the type of endangerment that RCRA's citizen suit provision was designed to address
(R. at 4). Appellee argues that its emissions are fully regulated
under the CAA and not subject to RCRA jurisdiction (R. at 4). Appellee's permits specifically state that the permitting authority rehttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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viewed every provision of federal and state law applicable to the
plants and determined that the permits reflect all applicable requirements of such law (R. at 7).
On the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment,
the United States District Court for the District of New Union
held that the particulate mercury emitted by Appellee's plants is a
solid waste and therefore regulated under RCRA (R. at 6). The
court also found that while FLT failed to demonstrate standing,
New Union was properly before the court (R. at 4). Ultimately,
the court held that Appellees' emissions are regulated under the
CAA and not RCRA.
The district court, ruling to dismiss on other grounds, did not
reach the complicated issue of whether a prior state court action
between Appellee and Bluepeace, Inc., a not-for-profit organization incorporated in the State of Blue Skies, precludes the present
action (R. at 5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's holding that mercury emitted in particle
form from coal burning power plants is a solid waste subject to
regulation under RCRA should be upheld. RCRA's statutory definition of solid waste is very broad and includes the provision "discarded material." Under general common usage of the terms,
mercury emissions are discarded and disposed of. They are no
longer used in the commercial process, no longer useful, and are
no longer wanted by the Appellee.
Furthermore, the comprehensive regulatory definitions of
solid waste, promulgated by EPA, are not applicable to citizen
suits brought to abate the harm from a solid waste. The regulations themselves provide that only the statutory definition is to
apply to such cases. This is significant because the regulatory definition of solid waste is narrower than the statutory definition.
However, if this Court utilizes the narrow regulatory definitions,
mercury emissions are still considered to be solid wastes. The regulatory definitions provide that the material must be abandoned
to be considered a solid waste. Undoubtedly, the mercury emissions in the present case have been abandoned, and have migrated from their original location. In any event, the district
court's holding that the mercury emissions are in fact solid waste
should be upheld.
9
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The district court's holding that FLT lacks standing should be
reversed. The Supreme Court requires three factors to satisfy
standing requirements: an injury in fact, a causal connection between the alleged action and the injury, and redressability. FLT
meets all three of these requirements. First, FLT's members' inability to eat the fish they catch is a concrete and particularized
injury in fact. Second, EPA's study establishes a causal connection between Appellee's mercury discharge and the fish poisoning.
Third, an injunction may be issued to protect the public welfare,
making FLT's injuries redressable. Therefore, the district court
should have granted standing to FLT.
The State of New Union, as parens patriae, also has standing
to bring suit. New Union acquires parens patriae status because
it is bringing suit to protect the public health and welfare of its
citizens. Therefore, it must satisfy the injury in fact test. This is
accomplished by the concrete harm of having its fish poisoned and
its citizens inability to use the fish they catch. Therefore, this
Court should uphold New Union's standing.
Air emissions resulting in mercury deposition present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment and are properly enjoined by a citizen suit under RCRA
section 7002(a)(1)(B). This action is precluded by neither regulation of these air emissions under the CAA nor compliance with
mercury standards in a state-issued permit. The plain language
of the CAA and RCRA establishes a statutory scheme that offers
dual regulation of activities impacting air quality. By considering
joint CAA and RCRA standards for air emissions, EPA clearly envisions dual regulation of air emissions. Indeed, it is sound public
policy to regulate air emissions under both the CAA and RCRA
and provide a seamless statutory scheme with the flexibility required for efficient regulation of the nation's air resources.
Furthermore, compliance with state-issued permits under the
CAA does not shield dischargers from citizen suits brought under
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B). The language of Appellee's permits is
too broad to offer a shield against the present action. Additionally, the legislative history of RCRA makes it clear that the citizen
suit provision is to be interpreted as a codification of the federal
common law of nuisance. Actions brought under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) are not properly characterized as collateral attacks
on permits issued under other statutes. The district court erred in
dismissing Appellants' action to enjoin Appellee from continued
emission of mercury.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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Finally, this Court should not rule on the issue of preclusion,
since the district court decided the case on other grounds and
chose to forgo any preclusive effect analysis of a prior state court
case. This Court has discretion on whether or not to hear the issue, and should allow the case to be heard on its merits in the
interests of public policy.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar
the present litigation. For res judicata purposes, the claims and
the parties are not the same with the prior state court action, and
the parties are not in privity. Under collateral estoppel, the
RCRA issues were not litigated, actually decided, nor necessary to
the prior court's decision. In addition, RCRA section 7002(b) does
not bar Appellant's present litigation because Appellants here
could only intervene in a federal court action. Since the prior action was in a state court, RCRA section 7002(b) should not preclude Appellant's present suit.
ARGUMENT
I.

MERCURY EMITTED IN PARTICLE FORM FROM
COAL BURNING POWER PLANTS IS A SOLID
WASTE SUBJECT TO REGULATION UNDER
THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND
RECOVERY ACT.

Under RCRA, for waste to be classified as "hazardous waste"
it must first qualify as "solid waste." RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(5) (1994). However, for purposes of the RCRA citizen suit
provision, a civil action may be commenced against any person or
corporation, "who is contributing to... [the] disposal of any solid
or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Initially, the issue of whether mercury emissions are covered under
RCRA is limited to the statutory and regulatory definitions of
"solid waste," thereby removing any need to explore the complicated statutory and regulatory definitions of "hazardous waste."
This Court's analysis of the definition of solid waste entails a
detailed interpretation of the statutory and regulatory definitions
that are governed by the rules of construction as defined in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). First, this Court must address "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue by focusing on the
11
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language and structure of the statute itself." Connecticut Coastal
Fishermen'sAss'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d
Cir. 1993). While a clear legislative purpose and definition ends
the court's inquiry, if the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. In the present case, both the statutory and regulatory definitions clearly indicate that mercury
emissions are "solid waste" for purposes of RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. section 6972(a)(1)(B).
A.

RCRA's statutory definition of solid waste is sufficiently
broad to encompass mercury emissions in particle form
from coal burning power plants.

The statutory definition of solid waste, as defined in RCRA, is
"any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other
discardedmaterial,including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining
and agricultural operations, and from community activities ....
.
RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994) (emphasis added).
While the statute offers no definition of the term "discarded
material," the ordinary plain-English meaning of the word discarded is "disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned." American
Mining Congress v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 824
F.2d 1177, 1183-1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court in American
Mining Congress (hereinafter "AMC") provided further insight by
stating that "the dictionary definition of 'discard' is to drop, dismiss, let go, or get rid of as no longer useful, valuable, or pleasurable." AMC, 824 F.2d at 1184 n.7.
Furthermore, while construing the same statutory language,
the Second Circuit stated that Congress intended for the reach of
RCRA to be broad. See Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n,
989 F.2d at 1314. Relying on legislative history, the court found
that Congress intended to include products within the term "discarded material," which no longer serve their purposes and are no
longer wanted by consumers. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 941491, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241). In
addition, the legislative history specifically states that the term
discarded material "is meant to expand, not limit, the common
meaning of the term solid waste." Hazardous Waste Management
System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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Reg. 33084, 33091 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261) (emphasis in original).
The statutory language is clear on its face and unambiguous
as to the definition of solid waste. The mercury emissions in this
case, by virtue of being emitted into the airstream with no intent
of ever being reclaimed, captured, or sought after in any manner,
clearly have been discarded, abandoned, gotten rid of, and obviously no longer serve any purpose.
Despite the fact that "discarded material" is not defined in
RCRA, it does define the term "disposal" which is clearly synonymous with the term discard. Disposal is defined as "the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water. .. ."
RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Again, the definition of"disposal" serves to broaden the statutory definition of solid waste
even further. See Connecticut CoastalFishermen'sAss'n, 989 F.2d
at 1314. The act of allowing the mercury particles to escape into
the atmosphere constitutes disposal due to the fact that the particles must eventually return to the surface, and in effect have been
"placed" into or on any land or water.
The statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face.
Without question, mercury particles emitted from coal burning
power plants are disposed of and discarded material that no
longer serve any purpose and are considered to be a solid waste
under RCRA.
B.

The regulatory definitions of solid waste promulgated by
EPA are not applicable to solid wastes defined for
purposes of the citizen suit provision.

If the court finds that RCRA is silent or ambiguous with respect to the definition of solid waste and its applicability to mercury emissions, the court must look to the agency's determination
and decide whether the agency's "answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. In this
case, the "RCRA regulations create a dichotomy in the definition
of solid waste. EPA distinguishes between RCRA's regulatory and
remedial purposes and offers a different definition of solid waste
depending upon the statutory context in which the term appears."
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen'sAss'n, 989 F.2d at 1314.
The regulations define solid waste as "any discarded material." Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(a)(1) (1999). "Discarded material" is defined as any mate13
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rial which is abandoned. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(I). Finally,
abandoned materials are those that are "disposed of." See 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(1). Though at first glance the regulations do not
seem to differ with significant degree from the statutory definition, EPA has stated that its definition of solid waste is "narrower
than its statutory counterpart." Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's
Ass'n, 989 F.2d at 1314.
According to RCRA regulations, the regulatory definition of
solid waste "applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for
purposes of the regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA."
40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1). The regulation further states that EPA's
definition "does not apply to materials ... that are not otherwise
hazardous." Id. Finally, the regulation states that "[a] material
which is not defined as a solid waste in this Part ... is still a solid
waste ... for purposes of these sections if... in the case of Section
7003, the statutory elements are established." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261. 1(b)(2)(ii). As such, EPA has determined that the regulatory
definition of solid waste is not to apply to solid wastes defined for
purposes of a citizen suit under RCRA section 7002. See Comite
Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989). EPA did not specifically
mention Section 7002 because Congress had not yet enacted that
provision when EPA promulgated the regulation. See id.
Since EPA's regulatory definitions are reasonably related to a
permissible construction of the statute, the broader statutory definition of solid waste applies to citizen suits brought to abate an
imminent and substantial endangerment, while the narrower regulatory definition does not apply to citizen suits.
C.

In the alternative, mercury emissions are solid wastes as
defined by the regulations promulgated by EPA.

As stated above, the regulations promulgated by EPA define
solid waste as any discarded material that is abandoned by being
disposed of. See Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste,
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1999). Although this definition is allegedly narrower than the statutory definition, mercury emissions still meet
the regulatory definition of solid waste. In the ordinary sense of
the words, mercury emissions are abandoned because they are
never again sought after. The legislative history of the term
"abandoned" suggests a simple meaning of "thrown away." Hazardous Waste Management System; Definition of Solid Waste, 50
Fed. Reg. 614, 627 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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The emissions are free to enter the atmosphere and are never collected, re-used, or captured at any point in time. They are released into the airstream and, as a result, are thrown away.
In any event, this Court should uphold the district court's
holding that mercury emitted in particle form from Appellee's
smoke stacks of coal burning power plants is a solid waste for purposes of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. section
6972(a)(1)(B) (1994).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
APPELLANT FLT LACKS STANDING BECAUSE
IT CONSTRUED LUJAN TOO NARROWLY.

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court developed three criteria by which to determine standing:
First, the plaintiff must have "suffered an 'injury in fact'-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent. Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -the injury has to be 'fairly ...trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.' Third, it must be 'likely,' as
opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41-42 (1976)).
Because FLT satisfies all three of these criteria, the district
court must be reversed.
A.

FLT has standing because it satisfies the three
requirements of Lujan: injury in fact, a causal connection,
and redressability.
1.

Lujan's first requirement is satisfied because FLT has
suffered an injury in fact by its members' inability to
keep the fish they catch.

FLT roots its injury in two of its members' inability to eat or
give as gifts the fish they catch. As slight as this injury may be, it
nonetheless is an injury in fact. The district court explicitly recognized plaintiffs' inability to use their catch as an injury in fact,
stating that FLT has modest economic damages suitable for a tort
action (R. at 6). The Court in Sierra Club v. Morton held that even
15
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unquantifiable injuries, such as aesthetic and environmental well
being, are injuries in fact. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972). The district court acknowledged the existence of
such a harm, yet erroneously denied standing.
Lujan requires a concrete and particularized harm. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. FLT's two members have been injured because they can not keep the fish they catch. This is a concrete
economic injury because they are forced to purchase fish, where
before they acquired fish by their labor. The relatively small monetary value of their efforts in no way diminishes the concreteness
of their injury. Furthermore, it is necessary that the concrete injury be "actual or imminent." See id. FLT's members have an actual injury because the fish are presently contaminated with
mercury, and since Appellee continues to discharge mercury, the
actual injury will continue indefinitely.
FLT's injuries are also particularized. The Lujan Court defined particularity by stating that "the injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
n.1. FLT's members are two of only a relatively small number of
fishermen who use Lake Tokay on a regular basis, and the injury
personally affects their ability to utilize the lake to catch fish.
FLT suffered an injury in fact and this Court should reverse the
district court's denial of standing.
2.

EPA's study shows a causal connection between FLT's
injury and the actions of Appellee, satisfying the
second requirement of the Lujan test.

The second element of Lujan requires that the injury be
"fairly traceable" to Appellee, and "not the result of some third
party." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. This second element is easily satisfied by EPA's independent studies linking most of the mercury
in Lake Tokay to Appellee's two power plants. This Court is not
concerned with the actual validity of the allegation, but rather
whether a reasonable fact finder could find Appellee responsible
for the mercury contamination. See Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883-84 (1990) (reviewing the standard for
summary judgement under FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). FLT's members'
inability to fish is directly caused by Appellee's pollution. It is this
mercury contamination that created a danger if the fish were consumed, and caused the fishing ban to be enacted. Therefore, FLT
has standing because its members have suffered a concrete injury
that is fairly traceable to Appellee.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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Since FLT's injury is redressable by an injunction,
Lujan's third standing requirement is met.

Redressability will be determined by the possibility of any
remedies if the plaintiffs are successful. Once in court, FLT may
argue that an injunction should be granted to benefit the public at
large. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740 n.15. Indeed, an environmental harm favors the issuance of an injunction over money
damages. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). Not only is an injunction available, it is a likely result if Appellants succeed on the merits. Therefore, the district court should have granted standing.
B.

Because the three elements of Lujan are satisfied, the
district court's additional zone of interest analysis is
flawed and superfluous.

The district court added to its standing analysis another factor which was not included in Lujan. This was the zone of interest
analysis. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Data Processing dealt with challenges
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which "grants
standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute"' Id. at 153 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1964)). From this specific language of the APA the Supreme
Court demanded that the complaint be "arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute." Data
Processing,397 U.S. at 153.
However, the present case stems from the citizen suit provision of RCRA which states: "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person who is contributing to
the disposal of solid waste that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health or environment." RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994). Consequently,
Data Processing's APA analysis is inappropriate when Congress
has explicitly conferred the privilege of standing.
The Court in Bennett v. Spear dealt with this distinction, coming to the conclusion that a citizen suit provision "expands" the
zone of interest. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161-62
(1997). In light of Lujan and Bennett it is apparent that the zone
of interest test is an insignificant hurdle for citizen suits under
RCRA. The district court falsely applied a Data Processinganalysis to the present controversy. Data Processing demands a broad
17
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view of a statute, stating that "the trend is toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action." Data
Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. The purposes of RCRA range from
preserving and enhancing the quality of air, water, and land resources to protecting human health. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902 (1994). Thus, even under Data Processing's"zone of interest" analysis, FLT has standing.
III.

THE STATE OF NEW UNION, AS PARENS
PATRIAE, HAS STANDING BASED ON EVEN
THE MOST RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
OF THE STANDING REQUIREMENTS.

The district court's holding that Appellant New Union satisfies standing requirements, should be upheld. A state does not
automatically satisfy the standing requirements simply by the
very nature of being a state. Rather, it is treated as a "person"
under the RCRA citizen suit provision. See Ohio v. United States
Department of Energy, 503 U.S. 607, 614 n.5 (1992). As such, New
Union must satisfy an Article III analysis. However, it meets
even the most restrictive test due to its status as parens patriae.
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592
(1982). Parens patriae refers to the role of the state as parent of
the country and guardian of its citizens. See id. at 600. A state
must have a quasi-sovereign interest, such as protecting the
health and well being of its citizens, in order to have standing as
parens patriae. See id. at 607.
New Union has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the
health of its citizens and environment from the dangers of mercury poisoning. Parens patriae clearly incorporates such injuries,
since it is frequently used in public nuisance suits. See Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Parens patriae standing against sewage discharges); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (Parens patriae standing against noxious gases). A state
may rely on parens patriae to establish standing under a citizen
suit provision. See Maryland People's Counsel v. FederalEnergy
Regulatory Comm., 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Once a
state has established parens patriae, only an injury in fact is required. See id. at 321. The high levels of mercury in the fish and
the subsequent ban clearly create an injury in fact that is "concrete" and "actual." See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
In addition, New Union satisfies the other requirements of
particularity, causal connection, and redressability. See Lujan,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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504 U.S. at 560. Particularity is satisfied because parens patriae
considers all injuries within the state to have occurred against the
state as an individual entity. See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at
602. The causal connection and redressability factors are satisfied
by EPA's study and the possibility of an injunction, as discussed
above. Therefore, New Union has standing to bring suit.
Even if this Court should choose to deny the existence of
parens patriae, New Union has standing based solely on its injuries as a state. New Union satisfies the standing requirements of
Lujan, as described above. First, the injury in fact is created by
the necessity of having to enforce a ban in order to minimize the
harmful effects of Appellee's contamination. Second, the injury is
fairly traceable to Appellee's actions according to the study done
by EPA. Third, the injury is redressable by an injunction. See
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. An injunction would diminish New
Union's need to create and enforce the fishing ban, as it would
halt the mercury rain contaminating the lake and surrounding
watershed. Consequently, the district court's grant of standing to
New Union should be upheld.
IV.

A CITIZEN SUIT UNDER RCRA SECTION
7002(a)(1)(B) TO ENJOIN AIR EMISSIONS
RESULTING IN MERCURY DEPOSITION
PRESENTING AN IMMINENT AND
SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT TO HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT IS NOT PRECLUDED BY
EITHER REGULATION OF MERCURY EMISSIONS
UNDER THE CAA, OR COMPLIANCE WITH
MERCURY STANDARDS IN A STATE-ISSUED
PERMIT.

Appellee operates its fossil fuel fired power generating plants
under permits issued under the CAA. While these permits regulate emissions to air, subsequent deposition of pollutants is properly regulated under RCRA. The plain language of the two
statutes calls for dual, but not duplicative, regulation of activities
impacting air quality. Therefore, compliance with the terms of
their CAA permits cannot shield Appellee from further regulation
under RCRA. Furthermore, the citizen suits brought by Appellants under RCRA are not properly characterized as collateral attacks on the CAA permits held by Appellee. Appellants use of
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) is consistent with Congress' intent to
19

442

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

codify the federal common law of nuisance. The district court
erred in its decision to dismiss the present action.
A.

The CAA regulates mercury air emissions from major
stationary sources as a hazardous air pollutant but does
not prohibit regulation of mercury air emissions by
other means, so long as such means do not conflict
with the CAA.
1.

Air emissions are, according to the plain language of the
statutes, regulated by both the CAA and RCRA.

The rules of statutory construction are well established. The
plain language of a statutory provision controls absent an irrational result. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 258-59 (1992). Where a statute is susceptible to two
meanings, the one that gives full effect to all of its provisions is
chosen. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990). Conflicting statutes must be construed harmoniously where possible.
See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
631-32 (1973).
The purpose of the CAA is "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population." CAA
§ 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). At
the outset, Congress found that "air pollution prevention (that is,
the reduction or elimination, through any measures, of the ambient pollutants produced or created at the source) and air pollution
control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and
local governments." CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3). Subject to approval by the Administrator, states establish implementation plans and administer the CAA within their boundaries. See
CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). It is under this authority that
Blue Skies administers its clean air program.
The Administrator is required to develop, and transmit to
Congress, a comprehensive, national strategy to control emissions
of hazardous air pollutants from area sources in urban areas. See
CAA § 112(k)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(A). That strategy
"shall include a schedule of specific actions to substantially reduce
the public health risks posed by the release of hazardous air pollutants from area sources that will be implemented by the Administrator under the authority of this or other laws (including, but not
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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limited to ... the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) . ..."
CAA § 112(k)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
The CAA is "not to be construed as superseding or limiting
the authorities and responsibilities, under any other provision of
law, of the Administrator or any other Federal officer, department, or agency." CAA § 310(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7610(a). Indeed,
RCRA authorizes the Administrator to avoid regulatory duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the appropriate
provisions of the CAA, in a manner consistent with the goals and
policies of RCRA. See RCRA § 1006(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b)(1).
Among the objectives of RCRA is "promoting the demonstration, construction, and application of solid waste management, resource recovery, and resource conservation systems which
preserve and enhance the quality of air, water, and land resources." RCRA § 1003(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(10) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, "[tihe Administrator shall promulgate such
regulations for the monitoring and control of air emissions at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.., as may
be necessary to protect human health and the environment."
RCRA § 3004(n), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(n).
Just as the CAA authorizes EPA to delegate administrative
responsibility to the states, RCRA establishes procedures by
which states gain federal approval for their solid waste management programs. The Administrator must promulgate guidelines
to assist the states in developing solid waste management plans
which must consider "the varying regional, geologic, hydrologic,
climatic, and other circumstances under which different solid
waste practices are required in order to insure the reasonable protection of the quality of... ambient air quality." RCRA § 4002(b)
& (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6942(b) & (c)(1).
Both the CAA and RCRA authorize EPA to regulate air quality. RCRA's regulation of air quality is consistent with the language of the CAA. Read together, RCRA fills in gaps left by the
CAA. Regulation of air emissions under one statute does not preclude regulation under the other. Since mercury is regulated as a
solid waste under RCRA and a hazardous air pollutant under the
CAA, it should be anticipated that air emissions of mercury would
be subject to regulation under both statutes. See CAA § 112(b)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). Included in this regulation is the availability of equitable relief to citizens pursuant to RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B).
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Congress intended that pollution arising from air
emissions be regulated under both the CAA and
RCRA.

There can be no doubt that the CAA was intended to address
air emissions of mercury. The question is whether Congress intended to regulate air pollution under RCRA as well as the CAA.
The legislative history of RCRA indicates the breadth of Congress' intent. "[T]he Committee believes the RCRA regulatory and
enforcement program must be conducted in a manner that controls and prevents present and potential endangerment to public
health and the environment." H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576. This is consistent
with the notion that RCRA closes loop holes in environmental regulation for activities which did not fall squarely within the framework of media-specific statutes such as the CAA and the Clean
Water Act (CWA). See Enforcement Authority Guidance, 56 Fed.
Reg. 24393, 24396 (1991).
By providing the Administrator of EPA with the regulatory
combination of the CAA and RCRA, Congress increased the flexibility, and arguably the efficiency, of environmental regulation in
the United States. The broad language of RCRA fosters the "cradle to grave" theme, consistent with the expansive liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the counterpart to
RCRA which addresses inactive sites.
By regulating air quality under RCRA, Congress recognized
that releases of solid particles to the air can ultimately, as in the
present case, result in deposition of solid particulate matter. The
focus of the CAA is the effects of airborne pollutants. While Subchapter IV-A (Acid Deposition Control) of the CAA deals with deposition of air pollutants from the atmosphere, the scope of the
regulation is restricted to "acidic compounds and their precursors." CAA § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7651. "The purpose of [Subchapter
IV-A] is to reduce the adverse effects of acid deposition through
reductions in annual emissions of sulfur dioxide ... and ... nitrogen oxides .... " CAA § 401(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b). Mercury deposition is not regulated under the CAA. Therefore, while the
initial release might be permitted under the CAA, the end result
is a solid waste problem and is solely regulated under RCRA.
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As the agency charged with the administration of both
the CAA and RCRA, EPA interprets both statutes to
regulate air emissions.

Where the statutory language and Congress' intent is clear,
the question for the courts is whether the interpretation and application chosen by the agency charged with administering the
statute is reasonable. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). The Administrator of EPA is
authorized to "prescribe... such regulations as are necessary to
carry out his functions under [the CAA and RCRA]." CAA
§ 301(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1); RCRA § 2002(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6912(a)(1). In exercising its discretion, however, EPA must keep
in mind that RCRA is not limited to particular media, but rather
regulates releases to all media. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 24395; See
also 40 C.F.R. §§ 266.104-07 (1993) (RCRA emission standards to
control organic emissions, particulate matter and metals
emissions).
EPA recognized the broad reach of RCRA when it considered
joint standards for air emissions with the CAA. In guidance concerning the coordination of RCRA and CAA permitting processes,
EPA proposed that "standards would only be written out in the
CAA regulations, but they would legally be part of both the CAA
and RCRA regulations." Revised Technical Standards for Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 24212, 24248
(1997). Thus, both programs would have an obligation to address
the standards in permits issued under their authority. "EPA proposed this approach to provide the maximum amount of flexibility
for state permitting authorities to coordinate the issuance of permits and enforcement activities in a way which most effectively
addresses their particular situation." Id.
4.

Regulation of air emissions under both the CAA and
RCRA provides a seamless statutory scheme and is
justified as a matter of public policy.

Viewed in the context of environmental regulation on a nationwide basis, it is sound policy to regulate air emissions under
RCRA in addition to the CAA. Environmental pollution problems
do not always fit nicely into the media-based regulatory programs
of the CAA and the CWA. Solid wastes may be emitted to the air,
transported great distances, absorbed by precipitation, and intro23
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duced to surface waters and land. Through its life-cycle, a pollutant can invade all facets of the environment.
The CAA clearly addresses the health and environmental concerns relating to airborne pollutants. The CAA fails, however, to
address the health and environmental consequences of that pollution once it leaves the nation's air resources. As a matter of public
policy, it is imperative that the broad language of RCRA be read to
assume regulatory authority over pollutants which make the transition from air to either water or land.
B.

Appellee's compliance with the mercury standards in its
state-issued permit does not shield it from citizen suits
brought under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B).
1.

The language in Appellee's state-issued CAA permit,
which purports to incorporate all applicable law, does
not serve as a shield against citizen suits brought
under RCRA.

In its regulation of state clean air programs EPA established
a "permit shield" which protects permit holders from subsequent
enforcement actions based on provisions directly addressed in the
CAA permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(f) (1999). The provision was designed to provide the permit holder with certainty that compliance
with the terms of its permits would necessarily put it in compliance with the CAA.
Appellee asserts, and the district court agreed, that mercury
emissions addressed in its CAA permit activates the "permit
shield" provisions that EPA established in its regulations. The
preamble to Appellee's permit specifically states that the permitting authority "reviewed every provision of federal and state law
applicable to emissions from this facility and has determined that
such law contains no requirements applicable to it that are not
reflected in this permit" (R. at 7). The question is whether this
language is sufficient to invoke the protections of the regulatory
permit shield established by EPA.
EPA has stated that if the permit expressly provides that
compliance with the conditions of the permit shall be deemed compliance with any applicable requirements, such applicable requirements must be specifically identified in the permit. See 40
C.F.R. § 70.6(f). This permit shield has been interpreted as
preventing courts from finding liability under provisions of the
CAA which were directly addressed by the permit, but does not
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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serve to preclude a finding of liability under other statutes such as
RCRA. See Roy S. Belden, Preparingfor the Onslaught of Clean
Air Act Citizen Suits: A Review of Strategies and Defenses, 1
ENVTL. LAW 377, 420 (1995). The CAA permit shield adopted by
EPA is a narrow one. See id. at 420.
The mercury standard in Appellee's permit adopts the standard promulgated by EPA. At present (and at the time of permitting) EPA has promulgated national emission standards for
mercury, but those standards do not apply to fossil fuel fired
power plants such as those operated by Appellee. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.50 (1999). As the regulations stand, Appellee is in compliance with applicable national standards for mercury under the
CAA. Appellants concede that the permit shields Appellee from
action under regulatory provisions addressed in its permit. However, the broad language of the preamble is insufficient to shield
Appellee from enforcement actions based on violations of statutory
provisions outside the scope of the CAA.
2.

The citizen suits brought to enjoin Appellee's emissions
of mercury are authorized by RCRA as regulation of
solid waste and cannot be characterized as an
improper collateral attack on the state-issued
CAA permit.

The district court erroneously adopted Appellee's contention
that the use of the citizen suit provision of RCRA is an impermissible collateral attack on Appellee's CAA permit. The district
court's theory rested on a line of cases involving citizen suits
brought under an environmental statute to challenge permits issued under the same statute.
In Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Industries, the Fourth Circuit held that a collateral attack on a CAA permit was precluded
by the facility's compliance with a valid RCRA permit. See
Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Industries, 989 F.2d 157, 159 (4th
Cir. 1993). The court found that citizen suit provisions were not a
legitimate means of challenging EPA permitting decisions. See id.
The Sixth Circuit supported this conclusion and held accordingly
in Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., a case involving
the same facility and permitting issue addressed in Palumbo. See
Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1181
(6th Cir. 1993). The CAA's provisions for direct appeal of EPA
permit decisions to the circuit courts of appeals was discussed at
length by the Palumbo court. See Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 159. The
25
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court refused to give plaintiffs two bites at the proverbial apple.
Ultimately, the court saw "no evidence that Congress intended to
eviscerate the very permitting process that Congress itself set up,
and [would] not do so by entertaining [a citizen] suit." Palumbo,
989 F.2d at 162.
As the Greenpeace court stated, the legislative history of the
RCRA judicial review provisions indicates that citizen suits "are
prohibited ... with respect to siting and permitting of hazardous
waste facilities." Greenpeace, 9 F.3d at 1180-81 (quoting H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 98-1133, at 117-18 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5688-89). By precluding collateral attacks on
permitted activity, the Palumbo and Greenpeace courts concluded
they were merely prohibiting what amounts to an "end run"
around the limitations of the RCRA citizen suit provision. See
Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 161-62; See Greenpeace, 9 F.3d at 1181.
Similarly, the Third Circuit prohibited the use of the CAA citizen
suit provision to launch a collateral attack on provisions of a CAA
permit. See Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 1991).
These cases are distinguishable from the present case. The
facility in Palumbo and Greenpeace held a valid permit, issued
under RCRA, to operate as a hazardous waste incineration facility. The plaintiffs in each case were seeking to enjoin activity specifically addressed in the permit. The courts held that the
plaintiffs failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity to
raise their concerns throughout the permit process.
In the case at bar, the Appellants are seeking to enjoin Appellee's activities which present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment. Appellee was never
issued a permit under RCRA. The facilities at issue are power
plants rather than hazardous waste facilities. There are no issues
with regard to siting or permitting under the RCRA and the holdings of Palumbo and Greenpeace do not apply. This action has
been brought to address a solid waste problem which persists despite Appellee's compliance with the CAA.
The line of cases precluding the use of citizen suit provisions
to bring collateral attacks upon permits deals with plaintiffs suing
under the citizen suit provisions of the same statute under which
the permit was issued. Here, Appellants' action is authorized by
the citizen suit provision of RCRA. Appellee seeks to use compliance with a CAA permit to dismiss an action brought under
RCRA. The unique nature of the RCRA citizen suit provision auhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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thorizes its use to enjoin an otherwise legal activity which
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
and the environment. The district court acknowledged the flaws
inherent in characterizing the present action as an impermissible
collateral attack on Appellee's permits: "To be sure, the situation
here is not on all fours with the cited cases. They all concerned
attempts to use the enforcement or citizen suit provisions of a
statute to circumvent limitations on judicial review in the same
statute" (R. at 8). Appellants' action is properly brought under
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) and cannot be characterized as an improper collateral attack upon Appellee's CAA permit.
3.

The district court has jurisdiction over the present
action because it arises under RCRA, a federal
statute, and does not seek review of Appellee's CAA
permit.

The district court dismissed the present action for lack of jurisdiction. The court based this decision in part on the theory that
"citizen suit provisions do not grant jurisdiction to the district
courts for judicial review of state permit issuance" (R. at 8). The
court relied upon General Motors v. Environmental Protection
Agency as its principal authority. See General Motors v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 168 F.3d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1991). General
Motors is a case in which EPA determined that a permit violation
had occurred under the CWA and imposed a penalty. General Motors (GM), the holder of a state-issued CWA permit, contested the
administrative ruling and attacked the terms of its permit. GM
had not taken advantage of opportunities to contest the terms of
its permit prior to the initiation of enforcement action by EPA. In
denying GM's petition for federal review of its permit, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that
had GM pursued its state remedies and prevailed, then there
would have been no permit for the EPA to enforce; had GM done
so and lost, then it would have been prevented, under the doctrine of res judicata, from relitigating the validity of its permit
in a later enforcement proceeding before EPA.
Id. at 1381.
The district court cited a long line of cases in support of its
contention that state permits cannot be reviewed in federal courts
(R. at 8). See Public Interest Research Groups of N.J. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990); United States
27
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v. Gulf States Steel Co., 54 F.Supp.2d 1233 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Outboard Marine Corp., 702
F.Supp. 690 (D. Ill. 1988); Connecticut Fund for the Environment
v. Job PlatingCo., 623 F.Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1985). These cases
are distinguishable from the present case. Each of these cases
dealt with actions brought under the CWA. Here we are dealing
with RCRA. The cited cases all involved challenges to specific provisions of a CWA permit, raised in the context of an enforcement
action brought by either the state permitting authority or a citizen
group under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA. See General
Motors, 168 F.3d at 1381 (permittee challenges validity of NPDES
permit as defense in enforcement action); PIRG, 913 F.2d at 7778; NRDC, 702 F.Supp. at 692 (NRDC contests monitoring procedure required by NPDES permit); Connecticut Fund for the Environment, 623 F.Supp. at 209 (permittee challenges validity of
NPDES permit as improperly promulgated).
No attempt is made to challenge the validity of Appellee's
CAA permits. This action seeks to supplement the requirements
of the CAA permits by compelling compliance with the terms of
the RCRA imminent hazard provisions. Questions of federal law
are raised and a serious interstate pollution problem must be addressed. The present action was properly brought in the District
Court of New Union.
4.

The citizen suit provisions of RCRA preserve the federal
common law of nuisance when brought to address
activity presenting an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or environment.

The final rationale set forth by the district court as grounds
for dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint raises a continuing debate
over the propriety of a federal common law public nuisance action
to abate air pollution (R. at 9). The court makes a vague reference
to legislative history in an apparent attempt to perform a brief
Chevron analysis. Without citation to any authority, the court
states that "Congress spoke in the Clean Air Act to the precise
problem plaintiffs raise here" (R. at 9). If Congress has spoken to
the precise issue before the court, the inquiry comes to an end.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Where Congress is silent or ambiguous with regard to its intent, the question is whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable. See id.
The legislative history of RCRA makes it clear that "the primary goal of [RCRA section 7002 is] the prompt abatement of imhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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minent and substantial endangerments." H.R. REP. No. 98-198,
pt. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
RCRA is unique in authorizing citizen enforcement suits to abate
potential imminent hazards. See generally, Adam Babich, RCRA
Imminent HazardAuthority: A Powerful Tool for Businesses, Gov-

ernments, and Citizen Enforcer, 24

ENVTL.

L.

REP.

10122 (Mar.

1994) (Analysis of RCRA's citizen suit provision as an effective enforcement tool).
There is considerable debate over the broad reach of the citizen suit provision of RCRA. The Hon. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
while acknowledging the availability to citizens of remedies if a
permit is later found to be deficient, argued that "[tihe federal
common law, if applied under RCRA, would subject businesses
and municipalities to the unbridled and uncontrolled imposition of
what an individual judge might dictate in the case." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 98-198, pts. 1 and 2, at 20-21 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5648-49. Indeed, the availability of similar
citizen enforcement has been substantially limited under the
CAA. "The suggestion of a separate federal common law of nuisance applicable to the field of air pollution has been rejected."
Matthew Bender, 2 ENVTL. LAw § 2.03(2) (1999). Congress has
not given courts the power to develop federal substantive law in
the air pollution field. See id. § 2.03(2) n.2.
Despite opposition, it seems clear that broad citizen enforcement is precisely what Congress contemplated. "[E]xpansion of
the citizens suit provision will complement, rather than conflict
...efforts to eliminate threats as to public health and the environment." H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612. "Section 7003, therefore, incorporates
the legal theories used for centuries to assess liability for creating
a public nuisance . . .and to determine appropriate remedies in
common law .... Some terms and concepts, such as persons 'contributing to' disposal resulting in a substantial endangerment, are
meant to be more liberal than their common law counterparts." S.
REP. No. 96-172, pt. 1, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5019, 5023.
The district court was satisfied that Congress' enactment of
the CAA "as a comprehensive, detailed and pervasive scheme to
regulate air pollution" precludes a federal common law of nuisance to abate interstate pollution. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981). In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the States of
Illinois and Michigan brought a common law public nuisance suit
29
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against the City of Milwaukee, seeking abatement of the city's discharges into Lake Michigan. The Court held that Congress intended to fully occupy the field of water pollution control when it
enacted the CWA and thus displaced the federal common law of
nuisance. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 332.
Appellee argues the Milwaukee analysis extends to the CAA
and the field of air pollution. The district court followed their lead
and blindly applied Milwaukee without addressing the differences
between the citizen suit provisions of the CAA, CWA and RCRA.
As the Supreme Court noted, "[tihere is a basic difference between
filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). Injunctive relief is
specifically authorized under RCRA to fill in the gaps and abate
precisely the type of harm presented by Appellee's mercury emissions. As the legislative history indicates, this type of action is
exclusively available in RCRA and is not precluded by the holding
of Milwaukee.
Barring nuisance-type suits under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) would ignore the legislative history of the RCRA citizen suit provision and Congress' clear intent to codify, in RCRA
section 7002(a)(1)(B), the very federal common law of nuisance it
arguably displaced by Milwaukee in the CWA context. The legislative history underscores the difference between the scope of the
RCRA citizen suit provision and that of the CAA and the CWA.
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) should be interpreted broadly to give
force to Congress' intent to codify the law of nuisance as an action
to abate environmental hazards.
The court also interprets Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo as
giving the court discretion to deny equitable remedies to regulate
air pollution. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305
(1982). Romero-Barcelo involved a suit to enjoin Naval weapons
training resulting in discharges of ordnance to waters off the coast
of Puerto Rico. See id. at 307. The district court ordered the Navy
to obtain a CWA permit but refused to enjoin the Navy's operations during the permit process. See id. at 308. The Supreme
Court upheld the district court's order, ruling that refusal to issue
an injunction did not frustrate the purpose of the CWA. See id. at
314. The Court pointed to Congress' apparent intent that the statutory scheme not "deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies
other than an immediate prohibitory injunction." Id. at 316. The
Court in Romero-Barcelo did not establish a bar on actions seekhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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ing injunctions under the CWA, but rather clarifies that the courts
are authorized and expected to exercise their discretion when issuing prohibitory injunctions. See id. at 320.
It has been noted that "RCRA... is primarily a liability provision directed at endangerments that persist despite other environmental regulations." Babich, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. at 10131. The
First Circuit concurs with this expansive interpretation of RCRA's
regulatory provisions "to prevent case-specific situations that
threaten harm without creating a complex regulatory program."
Id. at 10131 (citing Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989)).
In Connecticut Coastal Fisherman'sAss'n, the Second Circuit followed suit by affirming the issuance of an injunction to abate pollution while making no ruling on whether a regulatory violation
had occurred. See Connecticut Coastal Fisherman'sAss'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1309, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993).
Use of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) to enjoin otherwise legal
activity to abate endangerments to health and environment is consistent with the public nuisance-like character of the provision.
As one commentator suggests, "[i]t may not be a coincidence that
Congress enacted § 7002(a)(1)(B) during the mid-1980s, when it
was turning its attention to imposing retroactive liability for
cleanup of CERCLA and RCRA corrective action sites, many of
which were contaminated as a result of conduct that was not necessarily illegal." Babich, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. at 10131 n.108.
While opponents to the establishment of a public nuisancelike action under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) argue that such a
provision will only serve to clog the dockets with frivolous suits,
proponents dismiss this fear and point to the lack of such a backlog of common law nuisance suits in state courts. See Babich, 24
ENVTL. L. REP. at 10133. Citizen suits under RCRA section 7002,
which require no action on the part of EPA, may be the least complicated and most cost-efficient means of protecting the environment. See id. at 10136.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in finding
that regulation and permitting of Appellee's facilities under the
CAA preclude the use of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) to abate pollution that presents an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health and the environment. Injunctive relief is authorized by
federal statute and appropriately sought in this case. The district
court's order dismissing the present action should be reversed.
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THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RULE ON THE ISSUE
OF PRECLUSION, BUT IF IT CHOOSES TO DO
SO, IT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE PRIOR
STATE COURT LITIGATION DOES NOT
PRECLUDE APPELLANTS FROM INITIATING THE
CASE AT BAR.

This Court should not rule on the issue of preclusion. The
general rule is that a federal appellate court does not consider an
issue not passed upon below. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
120 (1976). This is a rule "of discretion rather than jurisdiction,
and in the past we have heard issues not raised in the district
court when prompted by exceptional circumstances." Selected
Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983).
The district court did not pass upon the issue. It chose not to
decide the issues on their merits and granted summary judgment
due to other issues within the case (R. at 9). Furthermore, there
are ample public policy considerations justifying consideration of
the case on its merits and no circumstances dictate that it is essential that the issue be determined by this Court. The Appellee
is not unduly harmed by having to forgo any preclusive effect of
the decision in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. Civ.
98-27 (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 1999).
In the alternative, if this Court chooses to rule on the issue of
preclusion, the Court should not hold that the doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel, or RCRA section 7002(b) preclude
Appellants' present litigation.
A. The doctrine of res judicata does not preclude crossAppellees from litigating their claims.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action."
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). However, this bar is
limited to cases arising out of the same cause of action or claim.
See Manego v. Orleans Board of Trade, 773 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.
1985). Finally, the doctrine ofres judicata is limited to those cases
where the parties are identical, or subsequent litigation involves
parties that are in privity to parties in the prior litigation. See
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
Even though the court in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Power Co. made a final judgment on the merits (R. at 10-14), the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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claims and the cause of action in Bluepeace are not the same as
the present case. In Bluepeace, the mercury contaminated lake
was Lake Mordred, located in the State of Blue Skies (R. at 10-11).
In the present case, the mercury contaminated lake is located in
the State of New Union, which is not contiguous to Blue Skies (R.
at 9). Appellants are making claims under RCRA, while in
Bluepeace, the plaintiffs were relying on common law principles of
trespass, public and private nuisance, and were dealing with different state laws concerning air pollution permits and the like.
Even though RCRA is thought of as a federal codification of the
common law of nuisance, there are different legal theories relied
upon to prove prima facie cases. RCRA principles cannot be protected by plaintiffs seeking claims under nuisance laws.
In addition, the parties to the two cases are not the same. In
Bluepeace, the plaintiff was a non-profit organization incorporated
in Blue Skies (R. at 10). In the present case, Appellants are a nonprofit organization incorporated in New Union and organized for
the protection of Lake Tokay in the State of New Union (R. at 3).
Finally, the parties to the two disputes are neither identical,
nor in privity: "Res judicata will not operate to preclude a subsequent suit unless there is an identity of parties or privity." Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 144 F.3d 1243, 1247
(9th Cir. 1998). While Buena Vista Power Co. has been a party to
the two disputes, different citizen groups and different states have
been involved as plaintiffs in the two actions. However, "privity
exists between parties who adequately represent the same legal
interests." Id. None of the parties between these two disputes are
in privity to one another. The legal interests at stake are different. The claims involve "mercury contamination" of two different
lakes situated in two different states. Finally, the present suit involves claims regarding RCRA and cannot be integrated so easily
with claims of tort law.
B.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude crossAppellees from litigating the case at bar.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, states that when a particular issue has already been litigated, further litigation of the same issue is barred. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). There are four requirements that must be met to preclude certain issues from subsequent litigation. The first requirement is that the issue in the
second case must be the same as the issue in the first. Second, the
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issue must have been actually litigated. Third, even if an issue
was litigated in a prior action, collateral estoppel will not bar relitigation unless the issue was actually decided in that action. Finally, collateral estoppel will not apply unless the decision on the
issue in the prior action was necessary to the court's judgment.
See id.
The same problems arise in the present case with collateral
estoppel as with res judicata. The issues are not the same. Furthermore, since RCRA was not a part of the Bluepeace litigation,
the RCRA issue was neither actually litigated in that case, nor
actually decided. Of even greater importance, any determination
concerning RCRA was not necessary to the court's judgment in
Bluepeace. The court made its determination without discussing,
much less relying on, any provisions of RCRA. Appellee can not
bar Appellants' present case by virtue of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
C.

RCRA section 7002(b) does not preclude cross-Appellees
from litigating the case at bar.

Appellee claims that RCRA section 7002(b) should bar crossAppellees' claims in the present suit because RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(E) allows parties to intervene in suits "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the dispostion of the action may, as a practical
matter, impair or impede his ability to protect his interest."
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E) (1994). RCRA
section 7002(b) is inapplicable here for two reasons. First, there is
no reason to believe that Appellants in the present case could have
known about a similar law suit taking place in another state. Furthermore, there is no claim that the two lakes were polluted at the
same time, or that the Appellants here had become aware of the
pollution at the time of the Bluepeace litigation. Second, and more
importantly, RCRA section 7002(b)(2)(E) specifically authorizes
intervention only in federal cases. See id. There is no mention in
the statute of allowing intervention in a state action. Since the
prior litigation was in a state court, and did not involve the same
interests, claims, facts, or legal theories, RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(E) is unavailing.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and
RCRA section 7002(b), cannot be used to preclude Appellants from
bringing their claims or causes of action. The specific requirements of both res judicata and collateral estoppel have not been
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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met. In addition, the statutory requirements of RCRA section
7002(b) have not been met. Therefore, the present litigation
should not be precluded.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests
that the decision by the United States District Court for the District of New Union be reversed with respect to parts II and IV, and
upheld with respect to parts I and III.
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APPENDIX A - RCRA STATUTORY & REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
42 U.S.C. § 6902. Objectives and national policy
(a) Objectives
The objectives of this chapter are to promote the protection of
health and the environment and to conserve valuable material
and energy resources by(1) providing technical and financial assistance to State and local
governments and interstate agencies for the development of solid
waste management plans (including resource recovery and resource conservation systems) which will promote improved solid
waste management techniques (including more effective organizational arrangements), new and improved methods of collection,
separation, and recovery of solid waste, and the environmentally
safe disposal of nonrecoverable residues;
(2) providing training grants in occupations involving the design,
operation, and maintenance of solid waste disposal systems;
(3) prohibiting future open dumping on the land and requiring
the conversion of existing open dumps to facilities which do not
pose a danger to the environment or to health;
(4) assuring that hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the
environment;
(5) requiring that hazardous waste be properly managed in the
first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective action at a
future date;
(6) minimizing the generation of hazardous waste and the land
disposal of hazardous waste by encouraging process substitution,
materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and
treatment;
(7) establishing a viable Federal-State partnership to carry out
the purposes of this chapter and insuring that the Administrator
will, in carrying out the provisions of subchapter III of this chapter, give a high priority to assisting and cooperating with States in
obtaining full authorization of State programs under subchapter
III of this chapter;
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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(8) providing for the promulgation of guidelines for solid waste
collection, transport, separation, recovery, and disposal practices
and systems;
(9) promoting a national research and development program for
improved solid waste management and resource conservation
techniques, more effective organizational arrangements, and new
and improved methods of collection, separation, and recovery, and
recycling of solid wastes and environmentally safe disposal of
nonrecoverable residues;
(10) promoting the demonstration, construction, and application
of solid waste management, resource recovery, and resource conservation systems which preserve and enhance the quality of air,
water, and land resources; and
(11) establishing a cooperative effort among the Federal, State,
and local governments and private enterprise in order to recover
valuable materials and energy from solid waste.
(b) National policy
The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of
the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as
possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated,
stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment.

42 U.S.C. § 6903. Definitions
As used in this chapter:

(3) The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
37
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(5) The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.

(15) The term "person" means an individual, trust, firm, joint
stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body and shall include
each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States.

(27) The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does
not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid
or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under section
1342 of Title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material
as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
923) [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq.].
42 U.S.C. § 6905. Application of chapter and integration with
other Acts
(b) Integration with other Acts
(1) The Administrator shall integrate all provisions of this
chapter for purposes of administration and enforcement and shall
avoid duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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appropriate provisions of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et
seq.], the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C.A. § 1251
et seq.], the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [7
U.S.C.A. § 136 et seq.], the Safe Drinking Water Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300f et seq.], the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 [33 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq.], and such other Acts of
Congress as grant regulatory authority to the Administrator.
Such integration shall be effected only to the extent that it can be
done in a manner consistent with the goals and policies expressed
in this chapter and in the other acts referred to in this subsection.

42 U.S.C. § 6912. Authorities of Administrator
(a) Authorities
In carrying out this chapter, the Administrator is authorized
to(1) prescribe, in consultation with Federal, State, and regional authorities, such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this chapter;

42 U.S.C. § 6924. Standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities

(n) Air emissions
Not later than thirty months after November 8, 1984, the Administrator shall promulgate such regulations for the monitoring
and control of air emissions at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, including but not limited to open
tanks, surface impoundments, and landfills, as may be necessary
to protect human health and the environment.

42 U.S.C. § 6942. Federal guidelines for plans
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Guidelines for State plans

Not later than eighteen months after October 21, 1976, and
after notice and hearing, the Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal, State, and local authorities, promulgate regulations containing guidelines to assist in the
development and implementation of State solid waste management plans (hereinafter in this chapter referred to as "State
plans"). The guidelines shall contain methods for achieving the
objectives specified in section 6941 of this title. Such guidelines
shall be reviewed from time to time, but not less frequently than
every three years, and revised as may be appropriate.
(c)

Considerations for State plan guidelines

The guidelines promulgated under subsection (b) of this section shall consider(1) the varying regional, geologic, hydrologic, climatic, and
other circumstances under which different solid waste practices
are required in order to insure the reasonable protection of the
quality of the ground and surface waters from leachate contamination, the reasonable protection of the quality of the surface waters from surface runoff contamination, and the reasonable
protection of ambient air quality;

42 U.S.C. § 6972. Citizen suits
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States,
and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the
extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present transporter,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or

(b) Actions prohibited

(2)(E) In any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a
matter of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the Administrator or the State
shows that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.

REGULATORY PROVISIONS
40 C.F.R. § 261.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) This part identifies those solid wastes which are subject to
regulation as hazardous wastes under Parts 262 through 265, 268
and Parts 270, 271, and 124 of this chapter and which are subject
to the notification requirements of section 3010 of RCRA. In this
part:
(1) Subpart A defines the terms "solid waste" and "hazardous
waste", identifies those wastes which are excluded from regulation
under Parts 262 through 266, 268 and 270 and establishes special
management requirements for hazardous waste produced by conditionally exempt small quantity generators and hazardous waste
which is recycled.
(2) Subpart B sets forth the criteria used by EPA to identify
characteristics of hazardous waste and to list particular hazardous wastes.
(3) Subpart C identifies characteristics of hazardous waste.
(4) Subpart D lists particular hazardous wastes.
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(b)(1) The definition of solid waste contained in this Part applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the
regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA. For example, it
does not apply to materials (such as non- hazardous scrap, paper,
textiles, or rubber) that are not otherwise hazardous wastes and
that are recycled.
(2) This Part identifies only some of the materials which are
solid wastes and hazardous wastes under Sections 3007, 3013,
and 7003 of RCRA. A material which is not defined as a solid
waste in this Part, or is not a hazardous waste identified or listed
in this Part, is still a solid waste and a hazardous waste for purposes of these sections if:
(i) In the case of Sections 3007 and 3013, EPA has reason to
believe that the material may be a solid waste within the meaning
of Section 1004(27) of RCRA and a hazardous waste within the
meaning of Section 1004(5) of RCRA; or
(ii) In the case of Section 7003, the statutory elements are
established.
(c) For the purposes of Sections 261.2 and 261.6:
(1) A "spent material" is any material that has been used and
as a result of contamination can no longer serve the purpose for
which it was produced without processing;
(2) "Sludge" has the same meaning used in § 260.10 of this
Chapter;
(3) A "by-product" is a material that is not one of the primary
products of a production process and is not solely or separately
produced by the production process. Examples are process residues such as slags or distillation column bottoms. The term does
not include a co-product that is produced for the general public's
use and is ordinarily used in the form it is produced by the
process.
(4) A material is "reclaimed" if it is processed to recover a usable product, or if it is regenerated. Examples are recovery of lead
values from spent batteries and regeneration of spent solvents.
(5) A material is "used or reused" if it is either:
(i) Employed as an ingredient (including use as an intermediate) in an industrial process to make a product (for example, distillation bottoms from one process used as feedstock in another
process). However, a material will not satisfy this condition if distinct components of the material are recovered as separate end
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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products (as when metals are recovered from metal-containing
secondary materials); or
(ii) Employed in a particular function or application as an effective substitute for a commercial product (for example, spent
pickle liquor used as phosphorous precipitant and sludge conditioner in wastewater treatment).
(6) "Scrap metal" is bits and pieces of metal parts (e.g.,) bars,
turnings, rods, sheets, wire) or metal pieces that may be combined
together with bolts or soldering (e.g., radiators, scrap automobiles,
railroad box cars), which when worn or superfluous can be
recycled.
(7) A material is "recycled" if it is used, reused, or reclaimed.
(8) A material is "accumulated speculatively" if it is accumulated before being recycled. A material is not accumulated speculatively, however, if the person accumulating it can show that the
material is potentially recyclable and has a feasible means of being recycled; and that-during the calendar year (commencing on
January 1)-the amount of material that is recycled, or transferred to a different site for recycling, equals at least 75 percent by
weight or volume of the amount of that material accumulated at
the beginning of the period. In calculating the percentage of turnover, the 75 percent requirement is to be applied to each material
of the same type (e.g., slags from a single smelting process) that is
recycled in the same way (i.e., from which the same material is
recovered or that is used in the same way). Materials accumulating in units that would be exempt from regulation under § 261.4(c)
are not be included in making the calculation. (Materials that are
already defined as solid wastes also are not to be included in making the calculation.) Materials are no longer in this category once
they are removed from accumulation for recycling, however.
(9) "Excluded scrap metal" is processed scrap metal, unprocessed home scrap metal, and unprocessed prompt scrap
metal.
(10) "Processed scrap metal" is scrap metal which has been
manually or physically altered to either separate it into distinct
materials to enhance economic value or to improve the handling of
materials. Processed scrap metal includes, but is not limited to
scrap metal which has been baled, shredded, sheared, chopped,
crushed, flattened, cut, melted, or separated by metal type (i.e.,
sorted), and, fines, drosses and related materials which have been
agglomerated. (Note: shredded circuit boards being sent for recycling are not considered processed scrap metal. They are cov43
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ered under the exclusion from the definition of solid waste for
shredded circuit boards being recycled (§ 261.4(a)(13)).
(11) "Home scrap metal" is scrap metal as generated by steel
mills, foundries, and refineries such as turnings, cuttings, punchings, and borings.
(12) "Prompt scrap metal" is scrap metal as generated by the
metal working/fabrication industries and includes such scrap
metal as turnings, cuttings, punchings, and borings. Prompt
scrap is also known as industrial or new scrap metal.
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 Definition of solid waste.
(a)(1) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not excluded by § 261.4(a) or that is not excluded by variance granted
under §§ 260.30 and 260.31.
(2) A discarded material is any material which is:
(i) Abandoned, as explained in paragraph (b) of this section;
or
(ii) Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section; or
(iii) Considered inherently waste-like, as explained in paragraph (d) of this section; or
(iv) A military munition identified as a solid waste in 40 CFR
266.202.
(b) Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being:
(1) Disposed of; or
(2) Burned or incinerated; or
(3) Accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before
or in lieu of being abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or
incinerated.
(c) Materials are solid wastes if they are recycled-or accumulated, stored, or treated before recycling-as specified in
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this section.
(1) Used in a manner constituting disposal.
(i) Materials noted with a "*" in Column 1 of Table I are solid
wastes when they are:
(A) Applied to or placed on the land in a manner that constitutes disposal; or
(B) Used to produce products that are applied to or placed on
the land or are otherwise contained in products that are applied to
or placed on the land (in which cases the product itself remains a
solid waste).
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(ii) However, commercial chemical products listed in § 261.33
are not solid wastes if they are applied to the land and that is
their ordinary manner of use.
(2) Burning for energy recovery.
(i) Materials noted with a "*"in column 2 of Table 1 are solid
wastes when they are:
(A) Burned to recover energy;
(B) Used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels
(in which cases the fuel itself remains a solid waste).
(ii) However, commercial chemical products listed in § 261.33
are not solid wastes if they are themselves fuels.
(3) Reclaimed. Materials noted with a "*" in column 3 of Table 1 are solid wastes when reclaimed (except as provided under
40 CFR 261.4(a)(17)). Materials noted with a "-" in column 3 of
Table 1 are not solid wastes when reclaimed (except as provided
under 40 CFR 261.4(a)(17)).
(4) Accumulated speculatively. Materials noted with a "*" in
column 4 of Table 1 are solid wastes when accumulated
speculatively.

(d) Inherently waste-like materials. The following materials
are solid wastes when they are recycled in any manner:
(1) Hazardous Waste Nos. F020, F021 (unless used as an ingredient to make a product at the site of generation), F022, F023,
F026, and F028.
(2) Secondary materials fed to a halogen acid furnace that exhibit a characteristic of a hazardous waste or are listed as a hazardous waste as defined in subparts C or D of this part, except for
brominated material that meets the following criteria:
(i) The material must contain a bromine concentration of at
least 45%; and
(ii) The material must contain less than a total of 1% of toxic
organic compounds listed in appendix VIII; and
(iii) The material is processed continually on-site in the halogen acid furnace via direct conveyance (hard piping).
(3) The Administrator will use the following criteria to add
wastes to that list:
(i)(A) The materials are ordinarily disposed of, burned, or incinerated; or
45
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(B) The materials contain toxic constituent listed in Appendix VIII of Part 261 and these constituents are not ordinarily
found in raw materials or products for which the materials substitute (or are found in raw materials or products in smaller concentrations) and are not used or reused during the recycling process;
and
(ii) The material may pose a substantial hazard to human
health and the environment when recycled.
(e) Materials that are not solid waste when recycled.
(1) Materials are not solid wastes when they can be shown to
be recycled by being:
(i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to
make a product, provided the materials are not being reclaimed;
or
(ii) Used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial
products; or
(iii) Returned to the original process from which they are generated, without first being reclaimed or land disposed. The material must be returned as a substitute for feedstock materials. In
cases where the original process to which the material is returned
is a secondary process, the materials must be managed such that
there is no placement on the land. In cases where the materials
are generated and reclaimed within the primary mineral processing industry, the conditions of the exclusion found at
§ 261.4(a)(17) apply rather than this paragraph.
(2) The following materials are solid wastes, even if the recycling involves use, reuse, or return to the original process (described in paragraphs (e)(1) (i)-(iii) of this section):
(i) Materials used in a manner constituting disposal, or used
to produce products that are applied to the land; or
(ii) Materials burned for energy recovery, used to produce a
fuel, or contained in fuels; or
(iii) Materials accumulated speculatively; or
(iv) Materials listed in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this
section.
(f) Documentation of claims that materials are not solid
wastes or are conditionally exempt from regulation. Respondents
in actions to enforce regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA
who raise a claim that a certain material is not a solid waste, or is
conditionally exempt from regulation, must demonstrate that
there is a known market or disposition for the material, and that
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they meet the terms of the exclusion or exemption. In doing so,
they must provide appropriate documentation (such as contracts
showing that a second person uses the material as an ingredient
in a production process) to demonstrate that the material is not a
waste, or is exempt from regulation. In addition, owners or operators of facilities claiming that they actually are recycling materials must show that they have the necessary equipment to do so.
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APPENDIX B - CAA STATUTORY & REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
42 U.S.C. § 7401. Congressional findings and declaration of
purpose
(a) Findings
The Congress finds(1) that the predominant part of the Nation's population is
located in its rapidly expanding metropolitan and other urban areas, which generally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions
and often extend into two or more States;
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and
the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting
dangers to the public health and welfare, including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation;
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants
produced or created at the source) and air pollution control at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments; and
(4) that Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional,
and local programs to prevent and control air pollution.
(b) Declaration
The purposes of this subchapter are(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air
pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and
local governments in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of
regional air pollution prevention and control programs.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6

48

2000]
(c)

BRIEF

Pollution prevention

A primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise
promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, for pollution
prevention.
42 U.S.C. § 7410. State implementation plans for national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards
(a) Adoption of plan by State; submission to Administrator;
content of plan; revision; new sources; indirect source review
program; supplemental or intermittent control systems
(1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Administrator, within 3 years (or
such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) after the
promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality standard
(or any revision thereof) under section 7409 of this title for any air
pollutant, a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State. In
addition, such State shall adopt and submit to the Administrator
(either as a part of a plan submitted under the preceding sentence
or separately) within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) after the promulgation of a national
ambient air quality secondary standard (or revision thereof), a
plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such secondary standard in each air quality control
region (or portion thereof) within such State. Unless a separate
public hearing is provided, each State shall consider its plan implementing such secondary standard at the hearing required by
the first sentence of this paragraph.
(2) Each implementation plan submitted by a State under
this chapter shall be adopted by the State after reasonable notice
and public hearing. Each such plan shall(A) include enforceable emission limitations and other control
measures, means, or techniques (including economic incentives
such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions
rights), as well as schedules and timetables for compliance, as
may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of this chapter;
(B) provide for establishment and operation of appropriate
devices, methods, systems, and procedures necessary to49
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(i) monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air quality,
and
(ii) upon request, make such data available to the
Administrator;
(C) include a program to provide for the enforcement of the
measures described in subparagraph (A), and regulation of the
modification and construction of any stationary source within the
areas covered by the plan as necessary to assure that national ambient air quality standards are achieved, including a permit program as required in parts C and D of this subchapter;
(D) contain adequate provisions(i) prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, any source or other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere
with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, or
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in the applicable implementation plan for any other State under part C of
this subchapter to prevent significant deterioration of air quality
or to protect visibility,
(ii) insuring compliance with the applicable requirements of
sections 7426 and 7415 of this title (relating to interstate and international pollution abatement);
(E) provide (i) necessary assurances that the State (or, except
where the Administrator deems inappropriate, the general purpose local government or governments, or a regional agency designated by the State or general purpose local governments for such
purpose) will have adequate personnel, funding, and authority
under State (and, as appropriate, local) law to carry out such implementation plan (and is not prohibited by any provision of Federal or State law from carrying out such implementation plan or
portion thereof), (ii) requirements that the State comply with the
requirements respecting State boards under section 7428 of this
title, and (iii) necessary assurances that, where the State has relied on a local or regional government, agency, or instrumentality
for the implementation of any plan provision, the State has responsibility for ensuring adequate implementation of such plan
provision;
(F) require, as may be prescribed by the Administratorhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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(i) the installation, maintenance, and replacement of equipment, and the implementation of other necessary steps, by owners
or operators of stationary sources to monitor emissions from such
sources,
(ii) periodic reports on the nature and amounts of emissions
and emissions- related data from such sources, and
(iii) correlation of such reports by the State agency with any
emission limitations or standards established pursuant to this
chapter, which reports shall be available at reasonable times for
public inspection;
(G) provide for authority comparable to that in section 7603
of this title and adequate contingency plans to implement such
authority;
(H) provide for revision of such plan(i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of
revisions of such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard or the availability of improved or more expeditious
methods of attaining such standard, and
(ii) except as provided in paragraph (3)(C), whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to the Administrator that the plan is substantially inadequate to attain the
national ambient air quality standard which it implements or to
otherwise comply with any additional requirements established
under this chapter;
(I) in the case of a plan or plan revision for an area designated as a nonattainment area, meet the applicable requirements
of part D of this subchapter (relating to nonattainment areas);
(J) meet the applicable requirements of section 7421 of this
title (relating to consultation), section 7427 of this title (relating to
public notification), and part C of this subchapter (relating to prevention of significant deterioration of air quality and visibility
protection);
(K) provide for(i) the performance of such air quality modeling as the Administrator may prescribe for the purpose of predicting the effect
on ambient air quality of any emissions of any air pollutant for
which the Administrator has established a national ambient air
quality standard, and
(ii) the submission, upon request, of data related to such air
quality modeling to the Administrator;
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(L) require the owner or operator of each major stationary
source to pay to the permitting authority, as a condition of any
permit required under this chapter, a fee sufficient to cover(i) the reasonable costs of reviewing and acting upon any application for such a permit, and
(ii) if the owner or operator receives a permit for such source,
the reasonable costs of implementing and enforcing the terms and
conditions of any such permit (not including any court costs or
other costs associated with any enforcement action),
until such fee requirement is superseded with respect to such
sources by the Administrator's approval of a fee program under
subchapter V of this chapter; and
(M) provide for consultation and participation by local political subdivisions affected by the plan.
(3)(A) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-549, Title I, § 101(d)(1), Nov. 15,
1990, 104 Stat. 2409
(B) As soon as practicable, the Administrator shall, consistent with the purposes of this chapter and the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 [15 U.S.C.A. § 791 et
seq.], review each State's applicable implementation plans and report to the State on whether such plans can be revised in relation
to fuel burning stationary sources (or persons supplying fuel to
such sources) without interfering with the attainment and maintenance of any national ambient air quality standard within the
period permitted in this section. If the Administrator determines
that any such plan can be revised, he shall notify the State that a
plan revision may be submitted by the State. Any plan revision
which is submitted by the State shall, after public notice and opportunity for public hearing, be approved by the Administrator if
the revision relates only to fuel burning stationary sources (or persons supplying fuel to such sources), and the plan as revised complies with paragraph (2) of this subsection. The Administrator
shall approve or disapprove any revision no later than three
months after its submission.
(C) Neither the State, in the case of a plan (or portion thereof)
approved under this subsection, nor the Administrator, in the case
of a plan (or portion thereof) promulgated under subsection (c) of
this section, shall be required to revise an applicable implementation plan because one or more exemptions under section 7418 of
this title (relating to Federal facilities), enforcement orders under
section 7413(d) of this title, suspensions under subsection (f) or (g)
of this section (relating to temporary energy or economic authorhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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ity), orders under section 7419 of this title (relating to primary
nonferrous smelters), or extensions of compliance in decrees entered under section 7413(e) of this title (relating to iron- and steelproducing operations) have been granted, if such plan would have
met the requirements of this section if no such exemptions, orders,
or extensions had been granted.

(5)(A)(i) Any State may include in a State implementation
plan, but the Administrator may not require as a condition of approval of such plan under this section, any indirect source review
program. The Administrator may approve and enforce, as part of
an applicable implementation plan, an indirect source review program which the State chooses to adopt and submit as part of its
plan.
(ii) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no plan promulgated by the Administrator shall include any indirect source review program for any air quality control region, or portion thereof.
(iii) Any State may revise an applicable implementation plan
approved under this subsection to suspend or revoke any such program included in such plan, provided that such plan meets the
requirements of this section.
(B) The Administrator shall have the authority to promulgate, implement and enforce regulations under subsection (c) of
this section respecting indirect source review programs which apply only to federally assisted highways, airports, and other major
federally assisted indirect sources and federally owned or operated indirect sources.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "indirect source"
means a facility, building, structure, installation, real property,
road, or highway which attracts, or may attract, mobile sources of
pollution. Such term includes parking lots, parking garages, and
other facilities subject to any measure for management of parking
supply (within the meaning of subsection (c)(2)(D)(ii) of this section), including regulation of existing off-street parking but such
term does not include new or existing on-street parking. Direct
emissions sources or facilities at, within, or associated with, any
indirect source shall not be deemed indirect sources for the purpose of this paragraph.
(D) For purposes of this paragraph the term "indirect source
review program" means the facility-by-facility review of indirect
53
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sources of air pollution, including such measures as are necessary
to assure, or assist in assuring, that a new or modified indirect
source will not attract mobile sources of air pollution, the emissions from which would cause or contribute to air pollution concentrations(i) exceeding any national primary ambient air quality standard for a mobile source-related air pollutant after the primary
standard attainment date, or
(ii) preventing maintenance of any such standard after such
date.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (2)(B), the
term "transportation control measure" does not include any measure which is an "indirect source review program."
(6) No State plan shall be treated as meeting the requirements of this section unless such plan provides that in the case of
any source which uses a supplemental, or intermittent control system for purposes of meeting the requirements of an order under
section 7413(d) of this title or section 7419 of this title (relating to
primary nonferrous smelter orders), the owner or operator of such
source may not temporarily reduce the pay of any employee by
reason of the use of such supplemental or intermittent or other
dispersion dependent control system.

42 U.S.C. § 7412. Hazardous air pollutants
(b)

List of pollutants

(1) Initial list
The Congress establishes for purposes of this section a list of
hazardous air pollutants as follows:
CAS number
Chemical name

0

Mercury Compounds

(e) Schedule for standards and review
(1) In general
The Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing
emission standards for categories and subcategories of sources inihttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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tially listed for regulation pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section as expeditiously as practicable, assuring that(A) emission standards for not less than 40 categories and
subcategories (not counting coke oven batteries) shall be promulgated not later than 2 years after November 15, 1990;
(B) emission standards for coke oven batteries shall be
promulgated not later than December 31, 1992;
(C) emission standards for 25 per centum of the listed categories and subcategories shall be promulgated not later than 4 years
after November 15, 1990;
(D) emission standards for an additional 25 per centum of the
listed categories and subcategories shall be promulgated not later
than 7 years after November 15, 1990; and
(E) emission standards for all categories and subcategories
shall be promulgated not later than 10 years after November 15,
1990.
(2) Priorities
In determining priorities for promulgating standards under
subsection (d) of this section, the Administrator shall consider(A) the known or anticipated adverse effects of such pollutants on public health and the environment;
(B) the quantity and location of emissions or reasonably anticipated emissions of hazardous air pollutants that each category
or subcategory will emit; and
(C) the efficiency of grouping categories or subcategories according to the pollutants emitted, or the processes or technologies
used.
(3) Published schedule
Not later than 24 months after November 15, 1990, and after
opportunity for comment, the Administrator shall publish a schedule establishing a date for the promulgation of emission standards
for each category and subcategory of sources listed pursuant to
subsection (c)(1) and (3) of this section which shall be consistent
with the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2). The determination of priorities for the promulgation of standards pursuant to
this paragraph is not a rulemaking and shall not be subject to judicial review, except that, failure to promulgate any standard pursuant to the schedule established by this paragraph shall be
subject to review under section 7604 of this title.
(4) Judicial review
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Notwithstanding section 7607 of this title, no action of the Administrator adding a pollutant to the list under subsection (b) of
this section or listing a source category or subcategory under subsection (c) of this section shall be a final agency action subject to
judicial review, except that any such action may be reviewed
under such section 7607 of this title when the Administrator issues emission standards for such pollutant or category.
(5) Publicly owned treatment works
The Administrator shall promulgate standards pursuant to
subsection (d) of this section applicable to publicly owned treatment works (as defined in title II of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act [33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq.] ) not later than 5 years
after November 15, 1990.

(k) Area source program

(3) National strategy
(A) Considering information collected pursuant to the monitoring program authorized by paragraph (2), the Administrator
shall, not later than 5 years after November 15, 1990, and after
notice and opportunity for public comment, prepare and transmit
to the Congress a comprehensive strategy to control emissions of
hazardous air pollutants from area sources in urban areas.

(C) The strategy shall include a schedule of specific actions to
substantially reduce the public health risks posed by the release of
hazardous air pollutants from area sources that will be implemented by the Administrator under the authority of this or other
laws (including, but not limited to, the Toxic Substances Control
Act [15 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq.], the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act [7 U.S.C.A. § 136 et seq.] and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] ) or by
the States. The strategy shall achieve a reduction in the incidence
of cancer attributable to exposure to hazardous air pollutants
emitted by stationary sources of not less than 75 per centum, considering control of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from all
stationary sources and resulting from measures implemented by
the Administrator or by the States under this or other laws.
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42 U.S.C. § 7610. Other authority
(a) Authority and responsibilities under other laws not
affected
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter shall not be construed as superseding or limiting the authorities and responsibilities, under any other provision of law, of the
Administrator or any other Federal officer, department, or agency.
(b) Nonduplication of appropriations
No appropriation shall be authorized or made under section
241, 243, or 246 of this title for any fiscal year after the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1964, for any purpose for which appropriations
may be made under authority of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 7601. Administration
(a) Regulations; delegation of powers and duties; regional officers and employees
(1) The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter. The Administrator may delegate to any officer or employee of
the Environmental Protection Agency such of his powers and duties under this chapter, except the making of regulations subject
to section 7607(d) of this title, as he may deem necessary or
expedient.

42 U.S.C. § 7651. Findings and purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that(1) the presence of acidic compounds and their precursors in
the atmosphere and in deposition from the atmosphere represents
a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility,
and public health;
(2) the principal sources of the acidic compounds and their
precursors in the atmosphere are emissions of sulfur and nitrogen
oxides from the combustion of fossil fuels;
(3) the problem of acid deposition is of national and international significance;
(4) strategies and technologies for the control of precursors to
acid deposition exist now that are economically feasible, and improved methods are expected to become increasingly available
over the next decade;
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(5) current and future generations of Americans will be adversely affected by delaying measures to remedy the problem;
(6) reduction of total atmospheric loading of sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxides will enhance protection of the public health
and welfare and the environment; and
(7) control measures to reduce precursor emissions from
steam-electric generating units should be initiated without delay.
(b) Purposes
The purpose of this subchapter is to reduce the adverse effects
of acid deposition through reductions in annual emissions of sulfur dioxide of ten million tons from 1980 emission levels, and, in
combination with other provisions of this chapter, of nitrogen oxides emissions of approximately two million tons from 1980 emission levels, in the forty-eight contiguous States and the District of
Columbia. It is the intent of this subchapter to effectuate such
reductions by requiring compliance by affected sources with prescribed emission limitations by specified deadlines, which limitations may be met through alternative methods of compliance
provided by an emission allocation and transfer system. It is also
the purpose of this subchapter to encourage energy conservation,
use of renewable and clean alternative technologies, and pollution
prevention as a long-range strategy, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, for reducing air pollution and other adverse impacts of energy production and use.
REGULATORY PROVISIONS
40 C.F.R. § 60.2 Definitions.
The terms used in this part are defined in the Act or in this
section as follows:
"Act" means the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.)
"Administrator" means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency or his authorized representative.
"Affected facility" means, with reference to a stationary
source, any apparatus to which a standard is applicable.
"Alternative method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant which is not a reference or equivalent
method but which has been demonstrated to the Administrator's
satisfaction to, in specific cases, produce results adequate for his
determination of compliance.
"Approved permit program means" a State permit program
approved by the Administrator as meeting the requirements of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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part 70 of this chapter or a Federal permit program established in
this chapter pursuant to title V of the Act (42 U.S.C. 7661).
"Capital expenditure" means an expenditure for a physical or
operational change to an existing facility which exceeds the product of the applicable "annual asset guideline repair allowance percentage" specified in the latest edition of Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Publication 534 and the existing facility's basis, as defined
by section 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the total
expenditure for a physical or operational change to an existing facility must not be reduced by any "excluded additions" as defined
in IRS Publication 534, as would be done for tax purposes.
"Clean coal technology demonstration project" means a project using funds appropriated under the heading 'Department of
Energy-Clean Coal Technology', up to a total amount of
$2,500,000,000 for commercial demonstrations of clean coal technology, or similar projects funded through appropriations for the
Environmental Protection Agency.
"Commenced" means, with respect to the definition of "new
source" in section 111(a)(2) of the Act, that an owner or operator
has undertaken a continuous program of construction or modification or that an owner or operator has entered into a contractual
obligation to undertake and complete, within a reasonable time, a
continuous program of construction or modification.
"Construction" means fabrication, erection, or installation of
an affected facility.
"Continuous monitoring system" means the total equipment,
required under the emission monitoring sections in applicable
subparts, used to sample and condition (if applicable), to analyze,
and to provide a permanent record of emissions or process
parameters.
"Electric utility steam generating unit" means any steam
electric generating unit that is constructed for the purpose of supplying more than one-third of its potential electric output capacity
and more than 25 MW electrical output to any utility power distribution system for sale. Any steam supplied to a steam distribution system for the purpose of providing steam to a steam-electric
generator that would produce electrical energy for sale is also considered in determining the electrical energy output capacity of the
affected facility.
"Equivalent method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant which has been demonstrated to the
Administrator's satisfaction to have a consistent and quantita59
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tively known relationship to the reference method, under specified
conditions.
"Excess Emissions and Monitoring Systems Performance Report" is a report that must be submitted periodically by a source in
order to provide data on its compliance with stated emission limits
and operating parameters, and on the performance of its monitoring systems.
"Existing facility" means, with reference to a stationary
source, any apparatus of the type for which a standard is promulgated in this part, and the construction or modification of which
was commenced before the date of proposal of that standard; or
any apparatus which could be altered in such a way as to be of
that type.
"Isokinetic sampling" means sampling in which the linear velocity of the gas entering the sampling nozzle is equal to that of
the undisturbed gas stream at the sample point.
"Issuance" of a part 70 permit will occur, if the State is the
permitting authority, in accordance with the requirements of part
70 of this chapter and the applicable, approved State permit program. When the EPA is the permitting authority, issuance of a
title V permit occurs immediately after the EPA takes final action
on the final permit.
"Malfunction" means any sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of air pollution control equipment, process equipment, or a process to operate in a normal or usual
manner. Failures that are caused in part by poor maintenance or
careless operation are not malfunctions.
"Modification" means any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, an existing facility which increases the
amount of any air pollutant (to which a standard applies) emitted
into the atmosphere by that facility or which results in the emission of any air pollutant (to which a standard applies) into the
atmosphere not previously emitted.
"Monitoring device" means the total equipment, required
under the monitoring of operations sections in applicable subparts, used to measure and record (if applicable) process
parameters.
"Nitrogen oxides" means all oxides of nitrogen except nitrous
oxide, as measured by test methods set forth in this part.
"One-hour period" means any 60-minute period commencing
on the hour.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6

60

2000]

BRIEF

483

"Opacity" means the degree to which emissions reduce the
transmission of light and obscure the view of an object in the
background.
"Owner or operator" means any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises an affected facility or a stationary
source of which an affected facility is a part.
"Part 70 permit" means any permit issued, renewed, or revised pursuant to part 70 of this chapter.
"Particulate matter" means any finely divided solid or liquid
material, other than uncombined water, as measured by the reference methods specified under each applicable subpart, or an
equivalent or alternative method.
"Permit program" means a comprehensive State operating
permit system established pursuant to title V of the Act (42 U.S.C.
7661) and regulations codified in part 70 of this chapter and applicable State regulations, or a comprehensive Federal operating
permit system established pursuant to title V of the Act and regulations codified in this chapter.
"Permitting authority" means:
(1) The State air pollution control agency, local agency, other
State agency, or other agency authorized by the Administrator to
carry out a permit program under part 70 of this chapter; or
(2) The Administrator, in the case of EPA-implemented permit programs under title V of the Act (42 U.S.C. 7661).
"Proportional sampling" means sampling at a rate that produces a constant ratio of sampling rate to stack gas flow rate.
"Reactivation of a very clean coal-fired electric utility steam
generating unit" means any physical change or change in the
method of operation associated with the commencement of commercial operations by a coal-fired utility unit after a period of discontinued operation where the unit:
(1) Has not been in operation for the two-year period prior to
the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and the
emissions from such unit continue to be carried in the permitting
authority's emissions inventory at the time of enactment;
(2) Was equipped prior to shut-down with a continuous system of emissions control that achieves a removal efficiency for sulfur dioxide of no less than 85 percent and a removal efficiency for
particulates of no less than 98 percent;
(3) Is equipped with low-NO subx burners prior to the time of
commencement of operations following reactivation; and
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(4) Is otherwise in compliance with the requirements of the
Clean Air Act.
"Reference method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant as specified in the applicable subpart.
"Repowering" means replacement of an existing coal-fired
boiler with one of the following clean coal technologies: atmospheric or pressurized fluidized bed combustion, integrated gasification combined cycle, magnetohydrodynamics, direct and indirect
coal-fired turbines, integrated gasification fuel cells, or as determined by the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy, a derivative of one or more of these technologies, and any
other technology capable of controlling multiple combustion emissions simultaneously with improved boiler or generation efficiency
and with significantly greater waste reduction relative to the performance of technology in widespread commercial use as of November 15, 1990. Repowering shall also include any oil and/or
gas-fired unit which has been awarded clean coal technology demonstration funding as of January 1, 1991, by the Department of
Energy.
"Run" means the net period of time during which an emission
sample is collected. Unless otherwise specified, a run may be either intermittent or continuous within the limits of good engineering practice.
"Shutdown" means the cessation of operation of an affected
facility for any purpose.
"Six-minute period" means any one of the 10 equal parts of a
one-hour period.
"Standard" means a standard of performance proposed or
promulgated under this part.
"Standard conditions" means a temperature of 293 K (68
<<degrees>> F) and a pressure of 101.3 kilopascals (29.92 in Hg).
"Startup" means the setting in operation of an affected facility
for any purpose.
"State" means all non-Federal authorities, including local
agencies, interstate associations, and State-wide programs, that
have delegated authority to implement: (1) The provisions of this
part; and/or (2) the permit program established under part 70 of
this chapter. The term State shall have its conventional meaning
where clear from the context.
"Stationary source" means any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/6
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"Title V permit" means any permit issued, renewed, or revised
pursuant to Federal or State regulations established to implement
title V of the Act (42 U.S.C. 7661). A title V permit issued by a
State permitting authority is called a part 70 permit in this part.
"Volatile Organic Compound" means any organic compound
which participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions; or
which is measured by a reference method, an equivalent method,
an alternative method, or which is determined by procedures specified under any subpart.
40 C.F.R. § 61.50 Applicability.
The provisions of this subpart are applicable to those stationary sources which process mercury ore to recover mercury, use
mercury chlor-alkali cells to produce chlorine gas and alkali metal
hydroxide, and incinerate or dry wastewater treatment plant
sludge.
40 C.F.R. § 70.6 Permit content.

(f) Permit shield.
(1) Except as provided in this part, the permitting authority
may expressly include in a part 70 permit a provision stating that
compliance with the conditions of the permit shall be deemed compliance with any applicable requirements as of the date of permit
issuance, provided that:
(i) Such applicable requirements are included and are specifically identified in the permit; or
(ii) The permitting authority, in acting on the permit application or revision, determines in writing that other requirements
specifically identified are not applicable to the source, and the permit includes the determination or a concise summary thereof.
(2) A part 70 permit that does not expressly state that a permit shield exists shall be presumed not to provide such a shield.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph or in any part 70 permit shall
alter or affect the following:
(i) The provisions of section 303 of the Act (emergency orders), including the authority of the Administrator under that
section;
(ii) The liability of an owner or operator of a source for any
violation of applicable requirements prior to or at the time of permit issuance;
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(iii) The applicable requirements of the acid rain program,
consistent with section 408(a) of the Act; or
(iv) The ability of EPA to obtain information from a source
pursuant to section 114 of the Act.
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